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Michel Foucault, Friedrich Kittler, and the interminable half-
life of “so-called man” 
Thomas Sutherland and Elliot Patsoura 
 
“The a priori character of causal necessity, on which Kant builds the principle of the validity of 
knowledge and the stability of nature,” observes Catherine Malabou, “is openly in question today” 
(2). Indeed, the Kantian critical project, premised upon a demarcation between empirical and 
transcendental modalities of thought, with the latter furnishing the necessary laws upon which the 
former is grounded (synthesized under a transcendental unity of apperception), is perhaps more 
unfashionable today than it has ever been. The critique of “correlationism,” a now familiar term 
coined by Quentin Meillassoux to describe the indivisible coupling of truth and being which he 
views as peculiar to the Kantian project and its varied inheritors, alongside a desire to undermine 
the simultaneously universalizing and exclusionary figure of “man” qua transcendental subject, has 
led to the very notion of transcendentalism being routinely challenged within contemporary 
continental philosophy, depicting it as little more than a dogmatic vestige of Enlightenment 
hubris. In the wake of speculative realism, new materialism, and other such undertakings, we find 
numerous currents of thought concerned with discrediting both the metaphysical primacy of 
“man," and the Kantian philosophical scaffolding accused of sustaining this figure. 
 
 Although it would be specious to treat these variegated currents as straightforwardly compatible, 
there are certain commonalities amongst them that we can identify: most pressingly, a scepticism 
regarding the very existence of the transcendental as a distinct modality of thought, and a desire to 
either ignore or transcend the boundaries placed around theoretical reason by such a modality, 
instead retrieving a “naïve” or pre-critical model of metaphysics. In these recent accounts, especially 
those that subscribe to the aforementioned thesis of correlationism expounded by Meillassoux, the 
arrival of the Kantian critical project in the late eighteenth century signals a tragic mistake in the 
development of philosophy, for it forecloses “the great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical 
thinkers” (7), impoverishing philosophy by wresting from it the authority to speak of an 
unconditioned absolute outside of and undisturbed by the finitude of human knowledge. As 
Graham Harman puts it, the “great error” of philosophy from Kant onward is its presumption that 
“a reflection on human being is the key to passing from an unphilosophical perspective to a 
philosophical one” (16). 
 
 Whether or not we accept this narrative (at the very least, it should be acknowledged that Kant’s 
foreclosure of the absolute to theoretical reason is not equivalent to its erasure from thought as a 
whole), there is no doubt that it exercises a powerful influence over present-day philosophy. What 
is rarely acknowledged, however, is that this vitriolically anti-Kantian narrativization through the 
lens of correlationism involves the conflation of two distinct, albeit related concepts arising from 
Kant’s work: on one hand, the separation of the empirical from the transcendental; on the other, 
the identification of “man” as the anthropocentric locus of this separation (and its simultaneous 
unity under the aegis of the transcendental). According to such accounts, at least implicitly, the 
dissolution of the primacy of “man” (and with said figure, the presumed need to reflect upon the 
boundaries of human knowledge as a precursor to any rigorous metaphysical enquiry) thus 
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demands the concomitant dissolution of all transcendental structures, and thus any presupposition 
of necessary conditions for thought.1 
 
 It is for precisely this reason that we must avoid equating these recent currents of thought with 
the “death of man” so famously proclaimed by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things (1966; 
hereafter OT), for contrary to these contemporary anti- or post-humanist departures from the 
Kantian critical project, it is in fact the foundational Kantianism of Foucauldian archaeology that 
renders the death of man desirable for the latter in the first instance. In his archaeological texts, 
Foucault demonstrates a continued adherence to the methodological circumscription of the 
Kantian critical project – and in particular, a heedfulness to the problem of thought’s 
anthropologization, by which the transcendental comes to be drawn illegitimately from the realm 
of the empirical – that belies the common wisdom that his pronouncement of the “death of man” 
is commensurate with the demise of Kantian transcendental thought. What Foucault actually 
proclaims is the death of the empirico-transcendental doublet with which transcendental 
philosophies from Kant onward have tended to delimit the boundaries of “man,” conceiving of 
this death as facilitated by a reinvigoration of the fundamentally Kantian demarcation of the 
empirical and the transcendental.2  
 
 In the remainder of this article, it is our aim to both explicate and uphold this transcendental 
circumscription in the face of “the immense provocation,” as Malabou would have it, “involved in 
the proposal that we relinquish the transcendental” (2-3), observing the confused and ultimately 
aporetic deadlock of anti-humanism, which continually re-presents and re-inscribes “man” in “his” 
absence. We wish to do this through reference to a single thinker – Friedrich A. Kittler – who 
explicitly attempts to go beyond Foucault by articulating an anti-humanism that purports to be 
unshackled by the empirico-transcendental doublet. Kittler develops a thoroughly anti-Kantian 
anti-humanism, a media theory that destabilizes and obsolesces this figure of “so-called Man,” 
subordinating it to the a priori media technologies through which its appearance is effected. We 
wish to counterpose Kittler against Foucault not only because the former is an influential, albeit 
very much contested figure in contemporary anti- and post-humanisms (especially within media 
studies) who engages quite directly with Foucauldian concepts and themes, but also because his 
work is emblematic of the denunciation of Kantian transcendentalism discussed above, attempting 
to collapse the empirico-transcendental doublet by folding the latter term entirely onto the former 
(not so much eliminating the transcendental as obscuring its function).  
 
  Over the course of this article, we will contend that Kittler draws loosely upon the familiar 
narrative of the “death of man” without entertaining either of what Marc Djaballah describes as  
 
the two guiding philosophical themes of Foucault’s work during the 1960s, the coupling 
of the empirical and the transcendental as the confused form of discourse on the human, 
and the analysis of literary discourse as the form of thought indicative of a transformation 
in it. (7) 
 
Both themes stand “as moments not only of Foucault’s reading of Kant, but of the Kantian form 
of Foucault’s thought” (ibid.) more generally. If Kittler’s attempted “update” of the Foucauldian 
archaeological vector and accompanying historicization of discourse analysis is explicitly anti-
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Kantian (inasmuch as it refuses to countenance any transcendental usage of reason that would 
identify a non-technically mediated, and thus non-empirical condition for experience), it would 
seem that it can only be so by extending the figuration of the “death of man” beyond the confines 
of its Kantian presentation in Foucault’s archaeology, leading only to the continued propagation 
(rather than elimination) of a confused discourse on the human – that of which the death of man 
is supposed to signal the end.  
 
 We consider Kittler exemplary of the follies of dogmatic anti-humanism precisely because in 
his hyperbolic, deliberately un-philosophical approach to these issues, in his utter confidence in 
being capable of finally exorcising any remnants of the Kantian spirit from the archaeological 
method described by Foucault, he inadvertently foregrounds the risks that come with bypassing 
the strictures of Kantian transcendentalism. In order to demonstrate this, we will examine more 
closely three key aspects of the Foucauldian archeological method: first, its hesitance to ascribe any 
direct causal role to external causation with regard to the historical a priori; second, its caution in 
conflating the transcendental figure of “man” with the autonomous human subject that is the 
target of so much anti-humanism; and finally, its refusal to speak determinately of our own 
contemporary “archive” by which our discursive statements are conditioned. Kittler, we will go on 
to suggest, in ignoring the Kantian tenor of the archaeological method, expunges much of this 
circumscription and circumspection, producing an admittedly compelling (and indisputably 
valuable), but nevertheless more dogmatic mutation of the archaeological project – one that 
unintentionally perpetuates the circularity of the empirico-transcendental doublet by deriving the 
transcendental (i.e. mediatic) conditions of “man” entirely from the latter’s own empirical 
experience. 
 
The (purported) limits of Foucauldian discourse analysis 
Any attempt to present a systematic overview of Kittler’s work is going to be both selective and 
reductive, for his writings do not conform to the conventions of philosophical disputation. Even 
Foucault, whose own corpus functions in decided opposition to systematicity in the specifically 
Hegelian sense of the term – that is to say, the insistence that “the true insofar as it is concrete exists 
only through unfolding itself in itself, collecting and holding itself together in a unity, i.e. as a 
totality” (43) – nonetheless writes books that, within themselves, mostly cohere argumentatively. 
This is not the case for Kittler, whose style of writing, whilst certainly drawing from the work of 
Foucault, is also manifestly influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Lacan, Harold Innis, and 
Marshall McLuhan, amongst others, all of whom spurn the niceties of prosaic scholarly writing. 
Although his works evidence considerable research and a deep knowledge of media at both a 
historical and technical level, Kittler’s presentation of ideas tends toward the aphoristic, digressive, 
and enigmatic, at once hyperbolic and polemical. 
 
 This style of writing – “a remarkably economic but also forbiddingly tortuous tongue” (Peters 
8) – places great difficulties upon us when trying to extract from his corpus anything in the way of 
sustained lines of reasoning. Not only are we faced with a decidedly oblique manner of writing, 
but we also must contend with Kittler’s various shifts in approach, and the distinct (and often 
directly contradictory) theoretical and philosophical directions of thought that traverse his project, 
often with little attempt at reconciliation or synthesis, including but not limited to: Lacanian 
psychoanalysis; the media determinism of Innis and McLuhan; information theory as formulated 
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by Shannon and Weaver (and other related theories from early computing, including those of 
Turing and Wiener); and certain key German philosophers, especially Hegel, Nietzsche, and 
Heidegger. He also draws heavily upon literature – from Homer through to Goethe, Stoker, and 
Pynchon – often seemingly treating the content of these texts as historical documentation in its 
own right.3 
 
 Although this theoretical and philosophical diffuseness complicates the identification of 
overarching themes, we nevertheless submit that Kittler’s corpus (and especially its anti-humanist 
component) remains heavily conditioned by the French “post-structuralist” tradition, and in 
particular, by Foucault’s major “archaeological” writings of the mid-to-late 1960s.4 “[Kittler’s] 
historical study of media,” writes Sybille Krämer, “becomes the heir of discourse analysis, but only 
in order to radically alter the inheritance” (97). Notwithstanding the often bewildering mosaic of 
divergent ideas wherein it is expounded, we would contend that the central thesis driving Kittler’s 
anti-humanist project – in short, his assertion that the philosophical image of “man” as a unitary 
transcendental entity is just the misrecognition of the media with which such a discourse is 
generated – can be identified as a guiding (though not always all-encompassing) thread running 
throughout much of his work, even if it cannot be clearly isolated to any single text. As N. 
Katherine Hayles puts it, Kittler “replaced foundations with media horizons beyond which 
questions are forbidden to reach” (129), firmly planting the conditions of possible experience 
within the immanence of this experience – the historically-contingent data structuration afforded 
through technical media providing the ultimate grounding of cognition and knowledge, 
demarcating the boundaries of possible experience within a determinate historical and mediatic 
epoch.5 
 
 Attempting to “update” Foucault’s archaeological methodology, Kittler appropriates the 
epochal narrative structure characteristic of the former’s highly influential OT, outlining a 
succession of discourse networks (rather than epistemes or discursive formations): epistemological 
configurations engendered by respective technical (rather than historical) a prioris that function as 
the mediate conditions of all possible experience. Kittler overrides Foucault’s often tentative 
response to the question of what causes change in the historical a priori by positing qualitative 
ruptures in the technical specifications of media – in particular, such media’s capacity for the 
processing, storage, and transmission of data – as responsible for such mutations. Yet in so 
attempting to resolve the problem of causation by “ground[ing] several of Foucault’s discursive 
irruptions in media-technological shifts” (138), Kittler’s deliberately provocative anti-humanism 
still largely recapitulates the basic structure of “death of man” narrative popularized by Foucault 
throughout this period, albeit complemented by a distinctly anti-Kantian positivism confident in 
its location of these technical a prioris that provide the conditions for the possibility of empirical 
experience within this very same domain. Crucial to Kittler’s work, argues Bernhard Siegert, is “the 
irreducible ‘onticity’ (if there is such a word) or facticity or worldliness of the transcendental,” 
which aims to “protect the concrete from the generalities, the irreducible singularities from the 
universals” (“Media After Media” 82). 
 
 Like Foucault before him, much of Kittler’s work constitutes a pointed fulmination against the 
orthodoxies of philosophical reason – in particular, philosophy’s tenacious and “perennially 
victorious campaign against the blindness of everyday life and non-philosophers” (“Thinking 
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Colours” 43) which privileges theoria at the expense of techne, forgetting the material basis of 
philosophical discourse – and has inspired “a vehement criticism of an ontological conception of 
philosophical terms,” aiming instead at “revealing the operative basis of those terms” (Siegert, “The 
Map” 15). Kittler posits this forgetting of media – the fact that “[t]he very concept of writing as 
philosophy’s own (technical) medium is missing from Aristotle onwards” – as the source of many 
of philosophy’s problems, but the one that he most directly and frequently foregrounds is that of 
“man” (“Towards” 24). Inspired by the aforementioned post-structuralist tradition, Kittler seeks 
to problematize this philosophical category, arguing that “there is no such thing as pre-discursive 
reality” (Literature 53), and thus no human essence outside of language and communication. 
Unlike Foucault, however, he does this not in the name of discourse per se, but in that of the 
discourse networks of technical media that constitute and condition such discourse. 
 
 “All knowledge, being a historical network of arguments,” Kittler claims, “presupposes certain 
media that have to acquire, store and transmit the relevant data,” and to that extent, “it is a direct 
function of technological thresholds” (“A Discourse” 159). The human individual is a discursive 
product of technical standards. Philosophy not only forgets these technical and mediatic 
preconditions for its own existence, but actively resists such a recognition and, in doing so, reifies 
the universalizing category of “man.” Unlike many other critics of post-Enlightenment humanism 
(especially those working within the post-structuralist framework), Kittler is not especially 
concerned by the power differentials implicated in gender, race, sexuality, colonialism, and other 
such categories that are elided in such an identification, but instead focuses his attention upon the 
historical contingency of the discourse network wherein this category of “man” is produced: “as 
long as memory is considered an attribute or even a peculiarity of the ‘human being,’ books, 
mnemo-techniques and memory machines must continue to be taken for granted, that is, veiled” 
(“Forgetting” 90).6  
 
 Kittler’s anti-humanist project, then, directs much of its censure at those philosophies that 
would continue to perpetuate this image of so-called man as a unitary, autonomous actor – more 
specifically, his object of critique is primarily the transcendental unity of apperception that lies at 
the heart of Kant’s critical project, which “gave his German followers the new order to put their 
transcendental ego into the middle of ontology” (“Towards” 28). In the course of this disputation, 
however, Kittler is not merely targeting the Kantian tradition, but also its prior critique by the 
post-structuralists. In this respect, Kittler’s approach relies upon, but also thoroughly reconfigures, 
the defining features of the Foucauldian archaeological vector. For Kittler, the importance of the 
Foucauldian account lies in its recognition that the category of man is not obvious or self-evident, 
but rather constructed through specific archival techniques and operations. According to Kittler, 
however, Foucault does not adequately reckon with the discourse network within which his own 
study is situated – the way in which the archive itself, as the material body within which the sources 
of Foucault’s findings are located, comprises a technical a priori determinative of his research. “It 
was Foucault's decisive step to define discourses as events with a certain materiality and with 
limited, not infinite effects,” writes Kittler, hence “the very possibility of his program of research 
– the analysis of discursive formations – is strictly contemporary with modern media-technologies” 
(“A Discourse” 158).  
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[W]riting itself, before it ends up in libraries, is a communication medium, the technology 
of which the archaeologist simply forgot. It is for this reason that all his analyses end 
immediately before that point in time at which other media penetrated the library’s stacks. 
Discourse analysis cannot be applied to sound archives or towers of film rolls. (Kittler, 
Gramophone 5) 
 
“Foucault, the last historian or first archaeologist” (ibid.), conceives of discursive rules as 
unproblematically comprehensible, and thus tends to analyse them only in terms of their form and 
application, overlooking the material restrictions of the archive itself that would not only enable 
such rules, but also constitute the conditions of possibility for his very enquiry into them. 
 
 Perhaps most importantly for Kittler, the Foucauldian method of archaeology fails to 
acknowledge that its later conception of the archive is in effect synonymous with the library, thus 
falling into tautology: if all is seen to emanate from the archive, it is precisely because it is within 
this particular form of (written and/or printed) archive that his research is conducted.7 The concern 
here is that “[a]ll libraries are discourse networks, but all discourse networks are not books” (Kittler, 
Discourse Networks 369), and as a result, this method cannot properly account for historical 
material that has not been produced under the aegis of print media. Specifically, what this single-
minded focus upon the printed text ignores is the way in which “the technological differentiation 
of optics, acoustics, and writing exploded Gutenberg's writing monopoly around 1880” (Kittler, 
Gramophone 16). Collapsing any distinction between empiricity and its transcendental conditions, 
Kittler appeals to an empirical development in media technologies in order to posit a direct causal 
agent for a change in the epistemological configuration of the discourse network. The gradual 
introduction of photography, phonography, and cinematography across the course of the 
nineteenth century (as well as the simultaneous development of the typewriter as a supplement to 
the printing press) not only dissolved the monopoly that writing and print had held over 
communication for the two prior millennia, but established a set of discrete media forms 
synchronized with and extending different aspects of human apperception. This has significant 
consequences for Kittler’s uptake of Foucault’s “death of man” narrative.  
 
 “Kittler’s media-historical analyses begin where Foucault’s end,” observes Krämer, transforming 
discourse analysis “into the reflex and symptom of a specific – and since ended – media epoch” 
(97). Whereas Foucault believes himself to be heralding the death of man over a century and a half 
after the emergence of this figure at the close of the eighteenth century, Kittler views him as failing 
to discern that man has been dead since the close of the nineteenth century, having been obsolesced 
by the discourse network of this new media environment: 
 
[t]he “I think,” which since Kant was supposed to accompany all of one's representations, 
presumably only accompanied one's readings. It became obsolete as soon as body and soul 
advanced to become objects of scientific experiments. The unity of apperception 
disintegrated into a large number of subroutines, which, as such, physiologists could 
localize in different centers of the brain and engineers could reconstruct in multiple 
machines. (Gramophone 188)8 
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In short, “[p]rinted laments over the death of Man or the subject always arrive too late” (Kittler, 
Discourse Networks 370), failing to account for the transformations in media that have occurred 
over the preceding two centuries.9 Consciousness is understood to store, transmit, and process data 
in a manner radically incompatible with the unitary synthesis of the Kantian model, let alone the 
self-mediating movement of the Hegelian Spirit, which “summed up the perfect alphabetism of 
his age” (Kittler, Gramophone 16).  
 
 Foucault’s mistake, Kittler suggests, was to herald the death of man at a time when this event 
had long since passed: the dramatic media-technological shift that occurred in the nineteenth 
century, breaking up the monopoly of writing and print, put to rest both the unity and autonomy 
of the human subject. As Mark Hansen writes, “[w]hile Foucault allows Man to play an active role 
as the “form” that shaped the episteme of the nineteenth century, even this is stripped away by 
Kittler,” revealing man to be “nothing more than an illusion, a purely passive construction of the 
autonomous force of information” (“Cinema” 68). For Kittler, because “the search for conditions 
that constitute ‘the human being’ … renews and prolongs the empirical-transcendental folding” 
(Truth 15), we must cease our speculations into the boundaries of human knowledge, and instead 
focus our attention upon media technologies – not as “extensions of man” (to follow McLuhan’s 
formulation), but as a prioris that elude this anthropocentric paradigm. Kittler expunges from the 
archaeological method of discourse analysis any remaining adherence to transcendental thought 
(and more specifically, the Kantian circumscription of the transcendental in relation to the 
empirical), depicting a field of immanence wherein both experience and its causes are located. In 
order to determine whether this attempt to resolve the problem of causation regarding historical a 
prioris actually clarifies the notion of a death of man, we must first look more closely at the 
Foucauldian model of archaeology. 
 
A thought from the outside 
According to Foucault’s foreword to the 1970 English translation of OT, the omission of media-
technological shifts from his archaeological work (the supposed misstep identified by Kittler) is no 
accident, for this lacuna results from a basic dissatisfaction with their explanatory efficacy. 
Responding to early critiques of the absence of such “traditional explanations” of the general and 
corresponding cross-disciplinary ruptures that OT takes as its object (and anticipating the future 
Kitterlian formulation of this critique), Foucault writes that “spirit of the time … social changes, 
influences of various kinds” and, most importantly for our purposes, “technological” changes, 
simply “struck [him] for the most part as being more magical than effective” (OT xiii; our 
emphasis). As such, there existed no sufficient “theory of scientific change and epistemological 
causality” (ibid.) at the time of OT’s composition. Foreseeing the development of said theory in 
time for future iterations of the archaeological method, OT proceeds by putting this “problem of 
causes to one side,” heavily circumscribing its explanatory claims to the point of making no 
empirical determinations concerning the causes driving such discontinuities. We might observe, 
however, that any such empirical determination is not only difficult to ground in the absence of a 
sufficient theory of epistemological change, but is in fact inadmissible within OT, and this for two 
reasons. 
 
 The first reason concerns the theory of epistemological causality Foucault subscribed to at the 
time of OT’s composition and publication, informing OT’s treatment of epistemological shifts, 
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including that under the moniker of the “death of man.” This theory of causation, which remains 
largely latent within OT itself, was elaborated in greater detail in concurrently-published work 
examining the writings of Maurice Blanchot, and came to be abandoned in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1969; hereafter AK) as part of what has been termed “Foucault’s turn from literature” 
at the close of the 1960s.10 Blanchot, of course, had by this point already firmly established his 
conception of literature as opening an enigmatic alterity, “the experience of what is without 
understanding, without agreement, without law … error and the outside, elusive, irregular” (205), 
and Foucault builds upon this, describing a “thought from the outside” that can only make itself 
apparent once the subject has disappeared. This is “a thought that stands outside subjectivity, 
setting its limits as though from without” (Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot” 15), an experience of 
exteriority that paradoxically leads us to an interiority that is nothing other than the being of 
language. 
 
 Within OT, however, Foucault only gestures toward this theory in a tentative, cautious manner, 
writing in the early stages of the book that discontinuity “probably begins with an erosion from 
outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which it has never ceased 
to think from the very beginning” (50; our emphasis). Although the allusion to Blanchot here is 
clear, by using the non-committal “probably” OT avoids positing a determinate cause responsible 
for effecting such discontinuities (and more specifically, conspicuously avoids directly identifying 
the thought of the outside with any such hypothetical cause), thus leaving archaeology’s self-
imposed methodological circumscription on the question of epistemological causality firmly intact. 
 
 Foucault depicts the being of language that occupies this space of the outside as the “unique 
and absolute,” “raw and primitive,” “single being of the written word” (OT 42-43) that went into 
disuse at the opening of the seventeenth century. Since that time, language has persisted only as “a 
particular case of representation (for the Classics) or of signification (for us),” dissolving an 
originary “kinship of language with the world” (OT 43), separating words from things, 
subordinating discourse to that which it seeks to represent or signify. OT ultimately serves to herald 
language’s “return” (303), a possibility indebted to figures like Sade and Hölderlin who 
“simultaneously introduced into our thinking, for the coming century, but in some way cryptically, 
the experience of the outside” (Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot” 17). Such an introduction sufficed 
not to restore language’s kinship with the world, as “[t]hat experience was afterward to remain not 
exactly hidden, because it had not penetrated the thickness of our culture, but afloat, foreign, 
exterior to our interiority” (Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot” 17). What Foucault designates 
“literature” thus serves to increasingly erode any notion of a constituent subjective interiority: 
 
throughout the nineteenth century, and right up to our own day … literature achieved 
autonomous existence, and separated itself from all other language with a deep scission, 
only by forming a sort of “counter-discourse,” and by finding its way back from the 
representative or signifying function of language to this raw being that had been forgotten 
since the sixteenth century. (OT 43-44) 
 
The return of language thus designates a critical mass of literary expositions of language’s “raw and 
primitive” being, eroding in turn the epistemological arrangement (specifically, that of “man”) 
charged with having exorcised this being since the late eighteenth century. 
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 In alluding to Foucault’s concurrent studies on literary limit experiences, OT suggestively and 
tentatively posits the “experience” of the outside as an indeterminate cause of discontinuities, open 
to a particular, asubjective modality of thought, but not to knowledge (a thoroughly Kantian 
distinction). Foucault’s reticence to fully designate this thought as the particular cause of 
epistemological change tout court, however, is due to its incommensurability with any subjective 
interiority: “the being of language only appears for itself,” Foucault writes elsewhere in 1966, “with 
the disappearance of the subject,” engendering “a thought that, in relation to the interiority of our 
philosophical reflection and the positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what in a word we might 
call ‘the thought from the outside’” (“Maurice Blanchot” 15-16). He suggests that discontinuities 
are caused by an experience outside that of any subjective synthesis (which accounts in part for the 
inadmissibility of empirical determinations in OT’s approach to epistemological change), and 
furthermore argues that such an experience is outright incommensurable with subjectivity. He thus 
speaks of the return of language as the return of a being fundamentally incommensurable with the 
very “being of man.” To wit,  
 
the right to conceive both of the being of language and of the being of man may be forever 
excluded; there may be, as it were, an inerasable hiatus at this point (precisely that hiatus 
in which we exist and talk), so that it would be necessary to dismiss as fantasy any 
anthropology in which there was any question of the being of language, or any conception 
of language or signification which attempted to connect with, manifest, and free the being 
proper to man. … [I]n Western culture the being of man and the being of language have 
never, at any time, been able to coexist and to articulate themselves one upon the other. 
Their incompatibility has been one of the fundamental features of our thought. (OT 339) 
 
 It is not surprising then that Foucault’s motif of erosion directly informs OT’s famous closing 
pronouncement on the death of man, not to mention the carefully delimited form of its 
presentation: “one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the 
edge of the sea” (OT 387). The past occurrences of such mutations at the archaeological level of 
thought, effecting a change in the historical a priori of previous epochs, point to the inherent 
mutability of the current historical a priori of “man.” In remaining unable to designate any 
empirical cause responsible for effecting this or any past mutation, however, Foucault can do no 
more here (at the close of a study effectively devoted to outlining the contingency of this figure of 
man) than venture that such an event will soon occur. The popular appeal of OT’s closing 
prophecy, invoking the recent birth and base contingency of “man” in an intellectual milieu thirsty 
for a succession to post-war humanism, has been well documented,11 yet the peculiar form of a 
certain “wager” that this pronouncement takes, remains deserving of further scrutiny as a product 
of OT’s methodological circumscription and its tentatively posited theory of epistemological 
change.  
 
The empirical and the transcendental 
This brings us to our second reason for the inadmissibility of the empirical in OT, concerning the 
Kantian commitments of Foucault’s study and most clearly manifest in its critique of post-Kantian 
philosophy. According to Foucault, with the appearance of Kant’s critical project in the late stages 
of the eighteenth century “there arises the problem of the relations between the domain of 
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empiricity and the transcendental foundation of knowledge” (OT 247). This is a problem that 
would continue to be felt up to Foucault’s day, making it  
 
probably impossible to give empirical contents transcendental value, or to displace them 
in the direction of a constituent subjectivity, without giving rise, at least silently, to an 
anthropology – that is, to a mode of thought in which the rightful limitations of acquired 
knowledge (and consequently of all empirical knowledge) are at the same time the concrete 
forms of existence, precisely as they are given in that same empirical knowledge. (OT 248) 
 
Foucault here dismisses both the transcendentalizing of empirical contents and their subordination 
to the syntheses of a transcendental subjectivity on the very same grounds, for both engender the 
anthropologization of thought, tracing out the transcendental figure of man (and the limits of 
possible experience) from within the empirical horizon of said empirical experience. The 
anthropologization of thought is thus not an issue on account of its inevitably giving rise to subject-
centred philosophies, but rather its illegitimate inversion of the very idea of Kantian criticism as 
determining “the rightful limitations of acquired knowledge” (ibid.). In deriving transcendental 
conditions from empirical knowledge, Kant’s critical distinction between transcendental and 
empirical, determining and determined, is turned on its head. 
 
 As an archaeological enquiry, it is not the function of OT to intricately set out the numerous 
examples of this inversion, so much as to demonstrate how such examples are made possible by the 
particular epistemological configuration of the modern’s epoch’s historical a priori of “man.” This 
figure, as an “epistemic structure” in place since the late stages of the eighteenth century, takes the 
form of a “doublet,” the dual subject and object of knowledge. As Kimberly Hutchings writes, “[i]t 
is not Kant’s critique in itself which decisively shifts the conditions of possibility of knowledge, 
but the way in which it makes possible the idea of man as both origin and object of knowledge” 
(78-79). It is the easy transposition of contents from one aspect of this structure to the other – the 
capacity to “give empirical contents transcendental value, or to displace them in the direction of a 
constituent subjectivity” (OT 248) – that inverts the traditional Kantian relation, engendering a 
circular and confused discourse on the human. “Anthropology as an analytic of man,” Foucault 
notes in the closing stages of the text, 
 
has certainly played a constituent role in modern thought, since to a large extent we are 
still not free from it. It became necessary at the moment when representation lost the power 
to determine, on its own and in a single movement, the interplay of its syntheses and 
analyses. It was necessary for empirical syntheses to be performed elsewhere than within 
the sovereignty of the “I think.” (OT 340) 
 
 By predicating the syntheses of empirical apperception (and the according empirical 
consciousness of oneself) upon an original and transcendental unity of apperception, Kant’s critical 
project marks the point in time at which the anthropological inversion of the 
transcendental/empirical relation becomes a possibility; for post-Kantian and indeed contemporary 
anti-humanists, however, simply doing away with this Kantian transcendental ego does not absolve 
them of the problem of the empirical and the transcendental insofar as these are both the products 
of the epistemic structure of man as dual subject and object of knowledge. Channeling Kant, what 
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Foucault terms philosophy’s “anthropological sleep” (ibid.) accordingly provides the chief 
justification in OT for the desirability of the death of man, and the thought of the outside its 
eroding tool. OT’s Kantian commitments thus not only drive Foucault’s dogged critique of post-
Kantian philosophy (and the circumscribed advocation of an asubjective thinking, rather than a 
knowing of a pre-critical, absolute outside) but also, and by extension, provide the impetus for the 
very desirability of the death of man.  
 
 If, after Kant, it is necessary for the synthesis of an empirical datum to be detached from the a 
priori surety of the transcendental ego, then it is equally necessary to have the thought of the 
epistemic structure responsible for engendering anthropological circularity (and, more specifically, 
of the event announcing its supersession) to also occur in a sphere distinct from that of the 
empirical, so as not to be drawn into the vortex of this circle, inverting the relation once more. 
This ultimately explains Foucault’s tentative “probably” on the question of the outside's erosion 
and the inadmissibility of empirical determinations as the causes of epistemological change in OT, 
insofar as any such reliance would be to derive the transcendental from that of the empirical, 
perpetuating the very problem of which the death of man is deployed to mark the end. Such events 
cannot, that is, be figured as responsible for effecting such a shift at the transcendental level of the 
historical a priori, for to do so would be to once more invert the Kantian relation by figuring an 
empirical content as effecting a change at the transcendental level. Any more “empirically 
complete” picture of such a mutation (analogous to Kittler’s own identification of technological 
changes as the empirical causes of transcendental mutations, to which we will soon return) would 
only signal the total subjection of such a heralding to that which it is charged with succeeding. 
 
 Given that Foucault himself proceeds in such instances to confuse his own archaeological claims 
with broader empirical ones, a distinction must be drawn here (as we have in greater detail 
elsewhere)12 between the declarations to be found in OT concerning such events (attempting to 
secure the absolution of archaeology from having to explicitly subscribe to a theory of 
epistemological change), and some of the more sensationalistic comments made by Foucault in 
interviews following the initial success of his book. 13  In the absence of a theory of epistemological 
change, if OT can only provide cautious declarations concerning the necessity, causes and form of 
this (at the very least desirable) mutation that is the death of man, this makes it doubly difficult for 
OT’s closing augury to have any popular purchase outside those concerned with upholding the 
virtues of the Kantian critical project (or, perhaps more precisely, an idealized and impossible 
variation on this project, for which the empirical and transcendental are not ceaselessly mixed) 
against its subsequent anthropological inversion.14  
 
 Strictly speaking, the mutation designated in OT by the phrase “the death of man,” is posited 
as desirable only on the basis of its potential return to a critically Kantian order of things (as distinct 
from the specificities of the Kantian system as a whole) that upholds the traditional relation 
between transcendental and empirical.15 Devoid of any normative judgement, archaeology can 
depict the philosophical subjection to the anthropological as a problem only insofar as it is a direct 
consequence of an illegitimate inversion of a central Kantian distinction. “Foucault’s own 
archaeological project,” observes Hutchings, “is an attempt to return to the moment of rupture in 
which, on his own account, the episteme of representation is confronted with the question of its 
limits” (80). OT, as an archaeological text, can strictly do no more than this, as the drawing of 
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what is effectively a transcendental determination concerning a change at the level of the historical 
a priori, from that of an empirical cause, would render it subject to its own critique of those 
philosophies deriving transcendental determinations from the empirical determinations they are 
posed as conditioning. This has a bearing on the case of Kittler specifically, as the claim that 
Foucault “forgets” the textual nature of the archive (thus deriving the transcendental concept of 
the historical a priori from an empirical and mediatic contingency) actually repeats the same 
manoeuvre in a more dogmatic fashion, attributing the death of man to a single, implicitly 
transcendental cause drawn directly from empirical experience. 
 
The givenness of the archive 
With the publication of Foucault’s methodologically revisionist AK came the construction of an 
archaeological theory of epistemological causality that not only allowed for such outright 
illegitimate or minimally suspect manoeuvres to be avoided, but one that fundamentally 
reconfigured the Kantian pretensions guiding OT (in particular, the formulation of the historical 
a priori as it was presented in the earlier text). Deploying two noticeable changes to the historical 
a priori, AK allows for the problem of causality (and, by extension, that of the confusion of the 
empirical and the transcendental) to be addressed, but in a thoroughly bounded manner that still 
leaves Foucauldian archaeology at odds with Kittler’s confident account of the technical a priori of 
the present. 
 
 First, AK actively and retrospectively dissociates archaeology from the formalizing and totalizing 
tendencies clearly exhibited in OT – as Béatrice Han describes it, Foucault no longer “commit[s] 
himself to any transcendentalist claims and simply intends his ‘historical a priori’ to indicate and 
underline the possibility of studying discourses in an autonomous way” (65). AK draws an explicit 
distinction between “this rather barbarous term” of the historical a priori, and that of the Kantian 
“formal a prioris whose jurisdiction extends without contingence” (127-128). The conception of 
the historical a prioris governing Western knowledge production was of course a defining claim in 
the archaeology of OT; however, in now claiming that “[t]he formal a priori and the historical a 
priori neither belong to the same level nor share the same nature” (AK 128), Foucault explicitly 
distances himself from the former text’s tentative invocation of a transcendent theory of external 
causation by positing in its stead a theory of immanent transformation of determining factors which 
no longer relies on the extraneous factors (however undetermined) previously alluded to with the 
concept of the outside.  
 
 Contrary to the concept’s presentation in OT, Foucault now contends that the historical a priori 
 
does not constitute, above events, and in an unmoving heaven, an atemporal structure; it 
is defined as the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice: but these rules are 
not imposed from the outside on the elements that they relate together; they are caught up 
in the very things that they connect; and if they are not modified with the least of them, 
they modify them, and are transformed with them into certain decisive thresholds. The a 
priori of positivities is not only the system of temporal dispersion; it is itself a transformable 
group. (AK 127) 
 
To be sure, the historical a priori as conceptualized in AK  
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cannot take account (by some kind of psychological or cultural genesis) of the formal a 
prioris; but it enables us to understand how the formal a prioris may have in history points 
of contact, places of insertion, irruption, or emergence, domains or occasions of operation, 
and to understanding how this history may be not an absolutely extrinsic contingence, not 
a necessity of form deploying its own dialectic, but a specific regularity. Nothing, therefore, 
would be more pleasant, or more inexact, than to conceive of this historical a priori as a 
formal a priori that is also endowed with a history: a great, unmoving, empty figure that 
irrupted one day on the surface of time, that exercised over men’s thought a tyranny that 
none could escape, and which then suddenly disappeared in a totally unexpected, totally 
unprecedented eclipse…. (128) 
 
Operating at a level beneath that of the Kantian formal a priori, AK posits a theory of immanent 
epistemological causality by sacrificing the totalizing purchase of OT’s conception of the historical 
a priori as an historicized transcendental for the comparatively weaker conception of an 
immanently transformable group of positivities.16 The question of the genesis of the formal a 
prioris (regardless of their psychological, cultural or, we might add, technical genesis) therefore 
now lies explicitly outside the purview of the archaeological method (as distinct from existing as a 
notable “problem”). Foucault’s qualified extension addresses the problem of causation outlined in 
the 1970 foreword without falling subject to either the confusion of the empirical and the 
transcendental, nor the deferral of causality to which Kittler’s approach will soon be shown to have 
succumb. 
 
 AK’s revision of the archaeological position on the problem of causality offers another spin on 
Kittler’s critique of the absence of media-technological shifts from Foucault’s work in this period, 
as the supplementation of the now weakened historical a priori with the archive restrains the 
archaeologist in a manner different to that seen in OT, by foreclosing the possibility of 
apprehending the contemporary. AK understands the archive as “[t]he domain of statements ... 
articulated in accordance with historical a prioris” (128). No longer possessive of the “appearance 
of a monotonous, endless plain” evoked in his previous description of a “surface of discourse,” the 
archive now exists for Foucault as “a complex volume,” as “systems of statements” within “the 
density of discursive practices ... that establish statements as events (with their own conditions and 
domain of appearance) and things (with their own possibility and field of use)” (ibid.). 
 
 To Kittler’s charge that Foucault fails to sufficiently delineate the nature of his (and our) own 
archive, one might respond that this is due not to a lack of trying on Foucault’s part, so much as a 
modified form of methodological circumscription that is once more dictated by the nature of his 
(now modified) archaeological method and object: 
 
it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that 
we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say – and to itself, the object of our 
discourse – its modes of appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence, its system of 
accumulation, historicity, and disappearance. (AK 130) 
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For Foucault, whilst the archive “in its presence ... is unavoidable,” it “cannot be described in its 
totality … emerg[ing] in fragments, regions, and levels, more fully, no doubt, and with greater 
sharpness, the greater the time that separates us from it” (ibid.). 
 
 “The analysis of the archive, then, involves a privileged region: at once close to us, and different 
from our present existence, it is the border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhands 
it, and which indicates it in its otherness; it is that which, outside ourselves, delimits us” (ibid.). 
For Foucault, the archaeological apprehension of the contemporary moment (that which, in OT, 
might amount to the outright delineation, rather than tentative wager, of a subsequent 
epistemological arrangement marked by the death of man) always already remains an incomplete 
(im)possibility. For although it grows increasingly accessible with one’s distance from the 
contemporary, this “never completed, never wholly achieved uncovering of the archive” (AK 131) 
is never accomplished to the point of total elucidation. It would thus appear that, regardless of his 
proximity to the Kantian concerns giving rise to OT’s death of man narrative, Foucault still poses 
a direct challenge to a Kittlerian anti-humanism. For whilst Kittler’s extension of the former’s 
archaeological vector would appear to avoid the issue of contemporaneity as much as possible by 
attending to the contemporary on the basis of distant technological developments of the early 
twentieth century, it still remains dependent on the observance of a comparatively crude and naïve 
theory of epistemological causation. 
 
 Foucault’s emphasis on the increasing (though asymptotic) clarity of the archive over time is 
coupled with the dissolution of the focus on the literate as a privileged means of epistemological 
erosion, AK marking the point at which the literary as transgressive thought loses its primacy for 
Foucault as an indicator of a transformation in the confused form of discourse on the human. In 
so unbounding the originally limited range of factors potentially conducive to epistemological 
change, Foucault presages both Kittler’s critique of the archaeological privileging of the written 
word, and his consequent anticipation of an anti-humanist future tied to the very dissolution of 
this privileging.  Where OT sought to effect an erosion of its own by way of an archaeological 
method geared toward tentatively invoking the outside - and in this sense, as Simon During notes, 
“belong[ing] itself, if somewhat tenously, to ‘literature’” (114) - by the time of AK “Foucault 
himself was ceasing to appeal to transgressive thought” (117). He was no longer prepared to “treat 
archaeology as a search for the origin, for formal a prioris, for founding acts” (AK 203), however 
cautious or circumscribed, so much as a means of charting the immanent transformation of a group 
of positivities. 
 
 If, as During observes, “archaeology occupies … a space bounded on the one side by modern 
positivism (and the replacement of the ‘synthetic a-priori’ by the ‘historical a-priori’) and on the 
other by transgressive thought” (113) embodied by literature, the transition from OT to AK marks 
a swing from one bordering tendency to the other, where Kittler might be seen waiting to join the 
party. From AK onward “[Foucault’s] gaze past the modern no longer fixes on the future – on the 
end of man and transgressive writing” (120), and as such, even if Kittler’s concern with the extra-
literate, having failed to register the cessation in AK of Foucault’s fixation with transgressive 
writing, is not quite as groundbreaking as he might believe, this gaze toward the future is one 
Kittler can at the very least be said to have restored in his predecessor’s wake. In short, Foucault 
and Kittler are at different times directed toward the same future end: having ceased to privilege 
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the literate’s erosive capacity, the former departs all too quickly from the archaeological theory of 
immanent transformation (before enough of its archive could be uncovered), whilst the latter 
commendably continued on this trajectory, even if (as we outline below) he ends up taking a 
questionable turn toward the determinate power of media technologies that fails to adhere to the 
circumscription still characteristic of Foucault’s archaeological swing toward positivities, thus 
concomitantly failing to resolve the problem of causation. 
 
The re-inscription of “so-called man” 
Although it may seem unfair to counterpose Kittler against Foucault, given the stylistic 
discordances acknowledged prior, and the general lack of systematicity within his corpus, we 
believe that the former’s patent desire to play the role of academic provocateur should not exempt 
him from such critique. Firstly, because his concepts, and his approach to media studies more 
broadly, have come to play an increasingly important role in this field of study over the past three 
decades. As Florian Sprenger remarks, in large part “the German Medienwissenschaft of the 1980s 
and 1990s was successful because it not only made new objects productive with new perspectives 
but allowed the blind spots of other disciplines – namely, their media-technical conditions – to be 
taken into account” (74), and this is chiefly a result of Kittler’s influence. This perspective has also 
become increasingly prominent in Anglophone media studies,  wherein it has been advocated as a 
“cold-turkey cure for hermeneutic and ideological fixation” (Packer 296), challenging the textual 
and representational focus of so much media research (an advocation with which we would at least 
somewhat concur). Secondly, because such complaints belie the sophistication of Kittler’s project, 
the detail and rigour of his research (notwithstanding the oft-peculiar conclusions that he draws 
from it), and the themes that run quite consistently throughout large swathes of his oeuvre. We 
consider his desire to ameliorate the purported deficiencies of Foucauldian discourse analysis to be 
a significant guiding thread in Kittler’s work and as such, we think it entirely reasonable to judge 
it by such standards. 
 
 There are two major discrepancies between Kittler and Foucault’s thought of interest to us here: 
the first concerning the essentially Kantian methodological concerns that provide the impetus for 
Foucault’s celebration of the death of man, and the second regarding the givenness of the archive, 
delimiting archaeological claims of and to the present. Kittler appropriates the totalizing features 
and anti-humanist rhetoric of the death of man from Foucault’s early archaeology, and a number 
of key conceptual innovations of the latter text of 1969 without, it would seem, sufficiently 
addressing the methodological considerations driving such decisions on Foucault’s part. In the first 
case, Kittler’s claim that “[e]very medium that brings the hidden to the light of day and forces the 
past to speak contributes, by gathering evidence, to the death of Man” (Discourse Networks 286) 
patently transcendentalizes our empirical apperception of media. In the second, his proposal that 
“[a]rcheologies of the present must also take into account data storage, transmission, and 
calculation in technological media” (Discourse Networks 369) presumes the archive (and in turn, 
the historical a priori) to be directly apprehensible within the empirical confines of the 
epistemological arrangement that it conditions. 
 
 Consequently, the folding of the transcendental onto the empirical does not actually eliminate 
the former, but merely obfuscates its function – and in particular, occludes Kittler’s idealization of 
media as technical a prioris. In both of the above cases, media are treated by Kittler as 
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unproblematically given to empirical experience, even whilst they furnish the transcendental 
conditions for said experience – precisely the situation that Foucault assiduously tries to avoid. By 
placing the media that philosophy has typically ignored (or actively disparaged) in the position of 
the transcendental conditions that were once monopolized by the human subject, making direct 
recourse to these media as determinate causal agents, Kittler actually reifies and idealizes media as 
merely formal entities, reducing them to a series of functions ascertained in advance (viz. storage, 
processing, and transmission) and thinking them through their relation with an empirical 
posteriority. He proffers, as Alexander Galloway describes it, “a hermeneutics of media devices as 
they appear after being pulled from the pit of history” (14), ironically categorizing them in relation 
to a pre-fabricated categorial schema.17 For Foucault, by contrast, the technical and mediatic 
conditions Kittler identifies as lacking in archaeology can serve only as insufficient causes driving 
the dissolution of the philosophical image of man. Indeed, if, according to Kittler, the 
anthropological sleep to which post-Kantianism is subject “dreams away the machines” 
(“Forgetting” 96), reintroducing them does not at all address the problem of causation. In updating 
Foucault through a recourse to empirical (and so, in the sense of OT, anthropological) 
determination, the thinking rendering such a manoeuvre reprehensible for Foucault (namely its 
inversion of the Kantian transcendental schema), is sidelined or, dare we say it, forgotten.  
 
 As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young remarks, if Kittler’s basic contention in this respect “is that 
epistemes change because media change” (in the same way that for Foucault, epistemes change 
because historical a prioris change), then “this is not much of an answer since it begs the obvious 
question: why do media change?” (138).18 By removing human agency from the equation, the 
problem of causation is not so much resolved as merely deferred: whilst the cause of epistemological 
discontinuity is clearly identified, the ultimate cause of developments in media technologies 
themselves remains either frustratingly underdetermined (as in the overly convenient appeal to 
military exigencies, or even more problematically given Kittler’s anti-humanist rhetoric, familiar 
romantic narratives of genius) or entirely undetermined.19 Our concern here though is not to assess 
the tenability of either the Foucauldian or Kittlerian approaches on the basis of their respective 
responses to this particular problem; rather, we wish to conclude this article by arguing that 
Kittler’s lack of methodological circumspection covertly reproduces the anthropologized subject of 
“man” which he seeks to abolish. Kittler’s shortcomings in this regard are characteristic not only 
of his own particular anti-Kantian, post-Foucauldian stance (nor indeed of many of Foucault’s 
own departures from his archaeological position), but more broadly of any anti-humanist position 
that attempts to uncover the determinative, empirical conditions of the figure of “man” qua unitary 
subject. 
 
 For Kittler, technical media seem to take the place of the enigmatic outside that Foucault (and 
Blanchot before him) views as stemming from literature, asserting that “[w]hat novels and systems 
of philosophical aesthetics formulate as wonders or enigmas can be explained in very simple – that 
is, technical – terms” (Truth 104). But whereas Foucault refuses to ascribe an unambiguous causal 
role to any such exteriority, acknowledging the pre- and post-Kantian dogmatic thirst for an 
absolute outside without sacrificing critical strictures at its behest, Kittler by contrast is more than 
willing to not only grant media this power (such that changes in their structuration of data directly 
engender epistemological ruptures), but to unabashedly draw such observations from empirical 
experience. Unlike Kant, who “could not but spirit away naked sensory data by way of synthesis” 
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(“Thinking Colours” 44), foreclosing the datum of sensibility to all cognition, Kittler’s adaptation 
of the Foucauldian archaeological vector embraces a conception of determination entirely 
immanent to the empirical, substituting a multiplicity of factical media for the unity of the 
transcendental ego. “All cultural techniques – from simple perception all the way to memory and 
thinking itself – are one with their appearance or phenomenality; that is to say, they arise from 
self-observation” (“Thinking Colours” 42). This does not actually eliminate the transcendental 
however, but merely supplies it with a more plastic and supple form, one that does not fret about 
its separation from that which it conditions. 
  
 In accordance with this “happy positivism” (“A Discourse 158), the death of man is presented 
no longer as an historically contingent epistemological rupture, but as the revelation of a universal 
transcendental principle, desirable not because it signals the return of a methodological 
delimitation between the empirical and the transcendental that might avoid falling into the trap 
of anthropologization (as is the case for Foucault), but because it unveils the true cause of 
epistemological change (thus actually collapsing the aforementioned boundaries).20 Whilst it might 
sometimes be couched in a certain level of pragmatist rhetoric – after all, he reassures us, “[e]very 
theory has its historical a priori” (Gramophone 16) – Kittler’s overall system, if we may speak of 
such a thing, is founded upon a quite consistent transcendental principle. Media form the necessary 
a priori conditions of experience, such that the figure of “man” is simply an “anthropocentric 
illusion” (“A Discourse” 166), a false and epiphenomenal unity, a surface effect fabricated from 
the media systems that underpin it. It is also through our apprehension of such media, however 
(facilitated by the fragmentation of media that occurred in the nineteenth century), that we might 
avoid such an illusion. “The empirical-transcendental doublet Man, substratum of the Romantic 
fantastic, is only imploded by the two-pronged attack of science and industry” (Kittler, Literature 
95). 
 
 The irony is that in attempting to so dismantle the assumptions of subject-centred philosophy, 
Kittler actually reifies the image of “so-called man” that he wishes to subvert. Although his project 
emphatically seeks to deny the unitary ego any transcendental primacy by dispersing its functions 
amongst a plethora of incompatible media, his overall aim is still tacitly to uncover the conditions 
of possible experience and, in doing so, cannot help but remain anthropocentric. Indeed, observes 
Hansen, “[r]ather than rejecting any hint of a lingering ‘humanism,’ as one might expect, [Kittler] 
brings home with emphatic force the similarity of carbon and silicon hardware” (“Symbolizing 
Time” 213), establishing a strict homology between the human and machine. Shifting said 
conditions of experience from the faculties of the mind to the data processing of external media, 
and thereby breaking down any presumed delineation between the transcendental and the 
empirical, does not at all eliminate the tacit notion of a synthetic unity by which the experience of 
“man” as a presupposed universal is constituted. By utilizing the death of man to symbolize the 
universal condition of mediatic determination, Kittler inscribes all media within a specific 
teleological horizon – that which determines the figure of “man” in “his” epiphenomenality – 
paradoxically reinserting this purportedly epiphenomenal and illusory figure as the overarching 
principle of the media-theoretical project. 
 
 As Justin Clemens puts it, ‘‘Kittler can only arrive at [his] conclusions by isolating and 
subjectivizing ‘media’ themselves, which are now covertly assigned the capacities that Kant himself 
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would have assigned to the individual human subject” (63). The result is that although the 
conditions of subjectivity are fragmented, dispersed amongst factical media, they still remain 
meaningful to Kittler because of their position within a transcendental structure through which 
the illusion of the transcendental ego is produced: media exist because “man is … an animal whose 
properties are not yet fixed,” and this relationship “ensures that the history of technology is not so 
ahuman that it would not concern people” (Optical Media 36). In other words, it is the very 
contingency and mutability of man’s apperception – its determination by the properties and 
capacities of the media forms that envelop it – that makes the study of media meaningful in the 
first place, ensuring that Kittler’s project remains oriented around the human being as the locus of 
experience. By attempting to isolate the cause of empirical experience through recourse to that very 
same experience, the empirico-transcendental doublet is retained, and the anthropological image 
of man maintained. 
 
 As with so much of the post-structuralist rhetoric regarding the decentred subject from which 
he draws, Kittler does not so much abolish the transcendental ego as broaden its confines (whilst 
preserving its overall unity). The Kantian schema – whereby the “I think” that accompanies all 
representations necessarily precedes empirical cognition – is inverted, so that this posited unity is 
nothing other than the illusory product of our empirical experience (as conditioned by media 
directly apprehensible within this experience), but it is not at all abandoned. The post-structuralist 
subject, as Sadie Plant describes it, is merely “an updated model no longer vulnerable to the 
dissolution it once feared; a subject even rejuvenated by its pretended dissolution,” one that “has 
learnt to live with the challenge of shifting foundations and uncertain perimeters and become 
reconciled with the vulnerability of its identity” (88), and this remains the case for Kittler’s “so-
called man,” granting the transcendental a mutable or aleatory element without ever relinquishing 
its ultimate authority. Against all his best intentions, Kittler unwittingly shores up the figure of 
man, by revealing the depths of “man” (i.e. that which undergirds the surface effect of the human 
subject as a unitary whole) to be nothing other than the media by which “his” experience is 
conditioned. Media are an exteriority that folds into an interiority, sustaining the ultimate 
coherence of these categories.  
 
 It is perhaps less surprising, then, that Kittler’s final, Philhellenic writings try to bring “man” 
back from the dead, so to speak – as Claudia Breger argues, “this return of man in the recent works 
suggests that his demise was incomplete in the first place,” his project being consistently 
“concerned less with displacing any anthropological enquiry than with problematizing affirmations 
of human autonomy” (126). In sum, Kittler’s approach suffers from the same setback that afflicts 
so many attacks upon the transcendental subject: by suturing the conditions of thought to the 
image of “so-called man” (such that the former are only philosophically meaningful on the basis 
of the latter), not only is the transcendental modality of thought covertly maintained (albeit now 
flattened onto its empirical counterpart), but the presence of “man” is re-inscribed in its absence – 
a universal subject in absentia. In observing this aporia, we do not advocate the installation of a 
new, “improved” universal human subject; rather, we hope to vindicate the Foucauldian 
circumspection regarding the transcendental determination of epistemic change, which would in 
turn entail a renewed consideration and maintenance of the Kantian critical circumscription of the 
empirical and the transcendental (without necessarily subscribing to Kant’s broader system) in 
subsequent endeavours. 
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1 We witness this, perhaps most acutely, in Meillassoux’s positing of a “hyper-chaos” that absolutizes 
contingency, such that “nothing is or would seem to be impossible, not even the unthinkable” (64). 
2 The presence of such Kantian gestures in OT, notes Étienne Balibar, is due to the “exquisite sensitivity of 
Kantianism to the tensions of an anthropological positivity” (59). Although for brevity’s sake we will not 
take this into consideration here, other noted “post-structuralist” philosophers, such as Gilles Deleuze 
(especially in Difference and Repetition) and Jean-François Lyotard also show strong sympathies to at least 
some form of Kantian transcendentalism, whatever their dissatisfactions with Kant’s project in the main. 
3 After all, Kittler insists that “literature (whatever else it might mean to readers) processes, stores, and 
transmits data, and that such operations in the age-old medium of the alphabet have the same technical 
positivity as they do in computers,” thus legitimizing literature as an information system (in concordance 
with the Shannon-Weaver model of communication) at the same time as he dismisses the hermeneutic 
obsession with literary meaning (Discourse Networks 370). 
4 For all the fondness that he shows toward Foucault and Lacan, Kittler seems to have little time for the 
work of Jacques Derrida, arguing in a quite pointed (albeit simplistic) rebuke to deconstruction that it is 
inevitable that one remains “within the space of philosophical discourse if one portrays and suppresses the 
Western metaphysics of presence in terms of another which, already by virtue of its name: arche-writing, is 
transcendental and categorial” (“Forgetting” 92; translation altered).  
5 Although Hayles often draws upon Kittler as a precedent for her own work on the “posthuman,” she 
rejects the unilateral causality he posits between humans and the media that condition them, seeking instead 
a more fluid and open-ended relationship between bodies and machines. 
6 As with many of his influences (e.g. Heidegger, Schmitt, Innis, McLuhan, etc.), Kittler’s politics are often 
deeply (and provocatively) conservative in orientation. Maybe the most troubling of such impulses is his 
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“participation in a discourse of European, and also German, identity,” which seeks to “re-capture collective 
identities in the age generally known as the age of globalization,” premised upon a primacy and originarity 
of Greek culture (Breger 126).  
7 “One does not need to derive the individual philosophically from the concept, nor denounce it, in Marxist 
fashion, as an ideological semblance; the individual is the real correlate of the new techniques of power that 
save its data and produce its discourses” (Kittler, “Authorship and Love” 28). 
8 A similar, but less cursory argument is put forward by Bernard Stiegler, who proposes that Kant’s model 
of schematism elides the fact that “schematics are originarily, in their very structure, industrializable: they 
are functions of tertiary retention; that is, of technics, technology, and, today, industry” (41).  
9 Given that he posits the transcendental ego as not internal, but discursive, Kittler elsewhere argues that 
“[t]he I then has its positivity only in the literary: as the shifter of the author’s proper name, which since 
the time of Kant and Herder must be able to accompany speech acts,” directly connecting it to the function 
of literary authorship (“Authorship and Love” 31). 
10 See O’Leary, who argues that whereas in the 1960s “literature was given a privileged status and role in 
Foucault’s work,” from 1970 onward (specifically, beginning with his inaugural lecture at the Collège de 
France) “it loses that role and becomes just one more possible object of analysis – and, in fact, an object of 
analysis which Foucault chose not to pursue” (104). 
11 See Miller 148-159. 
12 See Sutherland and Patsoura, wherein we interrogate Foucault’s “death of man” in light of François 
Laruelle’s “non-humanist” intervention. Laruelle is notable here insofar as the premises of his so-called 
“non-philosophy” lie in an attempt to overcome the empirico-transcendental doublet (as he argues explicitly 
in Le principe de minorité) by identifying a real and transcendental subjectivity that is not in any way mixed 
with empiricity, even as it determines the latter in a unilateral manner. 
13 On Foucault’s occasional, indulgent failure to distinguish between man as epistemic structure and man 
as empirical content – whereby he harnesses the popularity of OT and its defining trope for an explicitly 
and technically dissociated anti-humanist cause, ignoring the inconvenient fact that OT speaks not of 
humanism in this sense, and thus effacing much of the specificity of the concept of “man” (and, by 
extension, this figure’s death) in the process – see Han-Pile. 
14 We invoke said “impossibility” in light of Foucault’s earlier study of the intertwinement of Kant’s critical 
project and his lectures on anthropology, which shows Kant himself struggling to avoid the confusion of 
the empirical and the transcendental within his own critical work. See Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology, and Han 17-37. 
15 As Djaballah notes, following Léon Brunschvicg, we must distinguish “between the doctrine of the Kantian 
system and the idea of criticism” (1), with Foucault‘s considerations in OT being clearly driven by the latter. 
16 See Han 68. 
17 Similarly, Lisa Gitelman remarks that “it is as if Kittler doesn’t need to persuade his readers of details 
about why or how phonographs were invented because he already knows what phonographs are, and 
therefore he knows what (and particularly how) they mean … that is to make a medium both evidence and 
cause of its own history” (10). 
18 As During notes, directing us toward both Kant and Foucault’s sensitivity to the problem in the Critique 
of Pure Reason and OT, respectively, this is a “difficulty with the notion of ‘conditions of possibility’” that 
Foucault does not himself resolve (so much as respect): “They are recursive, moving into a mise en abîme. 
If, for instance, the archive is deemed to condition positivities, why stop there? How do we know that there 
is only one archive?” (100). 
19 “Kittler’s media histories systematically neglect what students of the diffusion of innovations call the 
‘implementation’ phase of new technologies – all the messy false-starts, slow creeping transitions, 
negotiations, and adjustments that occur in the long dull non-state-of-emergency between the births of new 
discourse-networks” (Peters 18). 
20 This notion of a “happy positivism” is derived from a concept often ascribed to Foucault, based upon his 
declaration that “[i]f, by substituting the analysis of rarity for the search for totalities, the description of 
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relations of exteriority for the theme of the transcendental foundation, the analysis of accumulations for the 
quest of the origin, one is a positivist, then I am quite happy to be one” (AK 125). It is our contention, of 
course, that Kittler’s positivism, in contradistinction to that with which Foucault associates himself in AK, 
precisely involves a return to the search for transcendental foundations and origins, under the guise of 
mediatic determination. 
